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HE legislature did not make any extensive changes in the Workers'
Compensation Act (the Act) during the Survey period. The legisla-
ture did, however, add two noteworthy amendments.1
One amendment provides for a twelve percent penalty and a reasonable
attorney's fee should the Texas Employers' Insurance Association 2 (the As-
sociation) fail or refuse to pay indemnity compensation when due.3 These
provisions only apply when the Board has approved a compromise settle-
ment agreement or when the court has approved an agreed judgment.4
Venue for such a suit is the same as for a suit to set aside the final ruling and
decision of the Industrial Accident Board5 (the Board).6 The amendment to
the statute contains no time limitations after which the Association shall be
deemed to have failed or refused to make payment. 7 As such, this amend-
ment will no doubt foster litigation aimed at defining the time limitations.
The legislature also enacted provisions granting subrogation rights to the
Second Injury Fund.8 This amendment grants the Second Injury Fund the
same rights and obligations as the Association would have with regard to
subrogation, recovery from third persons, and the right to attorney's fees.9
The amendment became effective September 1, 1985,10 and abrogates the
supreme court's holding in the recent case of Johnson v. Second Injury
Fund."I The Johnson court held that subrogation rights under the Act did
not exist except when clearly mandated by the legislature and that no such
mandate existed with regard to the Second Injury Fund.12 The amendment
* J.D., Baylor University School of Law. Attorney at Law, Ford, Needham & Johnson,
Dallas, Texas.
1. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5a (Vernon Supp. 1986); id. art. 8306, § 12
c(b).
2. See id. art. 8308, § I (creating the Association).
3. Id. art. 8307, § 5a.
4. Id.
5. See id. art. 8307, § 1 (creating the Board).
6. Id. art. 8307.
7. Id.
8. See id. art. 8306, § 12c(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (creating Second Injury Fund to com-
pensate those suffering a subsequent injury for combined incapacity).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 688 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1985).
12. Id. at 109.
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clearly mandates that subrogation rights do exist, effectively undermining
the basis of the court's decision.
Other legislative actions with regard to the Act were basically housekeep-
ing in nature.' 3
II. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Claim for Compensation
One of the statutory requisites of the Act is that a claim for compensation
shall be made within one year after the occurrence of the injury or first dis-
tinct manifestation of an occupational disease. 14 In Northbrook National In-
surance Co. v. Goodwin 15 the carrier contended that a fatal variance existed
between the worker's initial claim of a heart attack and the subsequent proof
at trial, which established that he had in fact suffered an angina attack. The
court reasoned that the initial claim placed the employer on notice of the
type of problem and gave the employer information as to the general basis
for the claim. 16 The court held that it would be unreasonable to require a
claimant specifically to identify the nature of an injury by the appropriate
medical category.17 This holding is consistent with the underlying rationale
of the Act's claim procedure. The Act seeks to provide sufficient notice to
the employer and insurance carrier to allow an appropriate investigation and
disposition of the claim. 18
B. Good Cause
Strict compliance with the Act's requirements that a claimant give notice
to his employer within thirty days after an injury or first manifestation of an
occupational disease and that a claim be filed with the Board within one year
may be waived for good cause in meritorious cases. 19 In The City of San
Antonio v. Miranda20 the worker failed to file a claim for compensation with
the Board until approximately eighteen months following his shoulder in-
jury. The court observed that the worker had a fourth grade education and
had performed heavy labor for the same employer for twenty-six years. A
13. The maintenance tax paid by insurance carriers for support of the Industrial Accident
Board was increased. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 28 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The
Board is given authority to remit the proceeds from subrogation recoveries to the State Treas-
ury for deposit to the Second Injury Fund. Id. art. 8307, § 6a(d). District and county clerks
are required to advise the Board of the filing of a workers' compensation suit and also required
to forward workers' compensation judgment to the Board, the expense of which will be taxed
as court costs. Id. art. 8309a, § 7. The requirements for filing reports regarding the prevention
of accidents and injuries to state employees applies only to state agencies. Id. art. 8309g, § 6.
Subrogation monies recovered by the State Employees Workers Compensation Program may
be used to pay compensation and other benefits to state employees. Id. art. 8309, § 18.
14. Id. art 8307, § 4a.
15. 676 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
16. Id. at 453.
17. Id. at 454.
18. Id. (quoting Johnson v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1971)).
19. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon Supp. 1986) (establishing
time limits as to notice of injury and claims for compensation).
20. 683 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
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doctor allowed the worker to return to work following his injury on more
than one occasion, although the worker continued to complain of pain in his
shoulder while working. The doctor diagnosed a pulled muscle. The worker
subsequently underwent surgery to repair a tear in the rotator cuff of his
shoulder. The worker claimed that he failed to file a claim for compensation
because he believed that his injuries were not serious.21 Texas courts have
held that a worker can establish the requisite good cause if he was acting
under the belief that his injury was trivial, and he was not provided affirma-
tive medical opinions to the contrary.2 2 Further, good cause may exist if a
physician actually advised a worker that his injuries were not serious and the
worker believes and relies upon that advice in the exercise of ordinary care. 23
The Miranda court held that the facts presented by the worker constituted
sufficient probative evidence to support the jury's finding of good cause. 24
A finding of good cause also waives strict compliance with the require-
ment that beneficiaries file a claim for compensation within one year of the
death of a worker. 25 In Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Goodwin26 the
widow of a lung cancer victim did not not file her claim for compensation
within the statutory period. The record revealed that the worker died of
lung cancer related to his exposure to asbestos fibres during his employment
many years prior to his death. His widow based her claim for compensation
upon death resulting from an occupational disease.
The court reiterated that the test for establishing good cause for delay in
filing a claim beyond the statutory period is that standard of conduct of an
ordinarily prudent person. 27 Texas courts have long recognized that a
worker has a reasonable period of time for investigation, preparation and
filing of a claim after he determines the seriousness of his injury.28 The
Goodwin court held by analogy that when the beneficiaries believe that death
may have resulted from an occupational disease, a reasonable period of time
is allowable for the investigation, preparation and filing of a claim. 29 Note
that in both the Miranda and Goodwin decisions the worker was required to
establish good cause for failure to file a claim not only during the statutory
period but for the entire period between the date of injury and the date of
filing. 3
0
21. Id. at 522.
22. See Harkey v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 208 S.W.2d 919, 922-23 (Tex. 1948); Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stanley 534 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
23. Harkey v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 208 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tex. 1948); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Rowan, 499 S.W.2d 338, 341-42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24. 683 S.W.2d at 523.
25. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon Supp. 1986) (establishing
one-year filing deadline for compensation).
26. 689 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
27. Id. at 470.
28. Hawkins v. Safety Casualty Co., 207 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. 1970); Moronko v. Con-
solidated Mgt. Ins. Co., 435 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1968); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v.
Renfro, 496 S.W.2d 277, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ dism'd).
29. 689 S.W.2d at 471.
30. 687 S.W.2d at 523; 689 S.W.2d at 471; see Continental Casualty Co. v. Cook 515
19861
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The statutory period during which a claim for compensation must be filed
may be extended in limited circumstances. The Act provides for a tolling of
the limitations period for the filing of a claim when the employer's first re-
port of injury3" is not filed as required by the Act.32 In Smith v. Home
Indemnity Co. 33 an injured worker failed to file his claim within the statu-
tory period and, without alleging good cause, relied upon the tolling provi-
sions of the Act. The worker admitted that he had not notified his employer
of the injury until eleven months after the injury occurred. The Act's re-
quirement for the filing of the employer's first report of injury was therefore
inapplicable, as were the tolling provisions of the Act.
34
C. Election of Remedies
A worker may waive his workers' compensation claim if he makes an in-
formed choice to pursue a course of action that is so inconsistent with his
workers' compensation claim as to constitute manifest injustice should he be
granted workers' compensation benefits. 35 This situation arises most often
in relation to workers' compensation claims in which a worker has filed for
benefits under his employer's group insurance policy.
In Overstreet v. Home Indemnity Co. 36 the supreme court reversed the
lower court's holding that a worker could not pursue a workers' compensa-
tion claim due to his election to obtain group insurance benefits. 37 The
lower court based its holding on a set of requests that had been deemed
admitted. 38 In a per curiam decision the supreme court held that the admis-
sions did not establish an informed election. 39 This holding underscores the
fact that the injured worker must do considerably more than sign and file a
group insurance application for benefits and receive benefits in order to es-
tablish an election of remedies.
In Smith v. Home Indemnity Co.40 the Fort Worth court of appeals af-
firmed a summary judgment in favor of the carrier based on election of rem-
edies.41 In Smith the worker was fully aware that group insurance was for
non-work-related injuries and that workers' compensation was for job-re-
lated injuries at the time he filed for group benefits. It was further estab-
lished that he received all available medical and disability benefits available
under the group insurance coverage before filing a workers' compensation
S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. 1974) (worker required to show good cause from date of injury to date
of filing).
31. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (establishing
employer's duty to file first report).
32. See id. art 8307, § 7a.
33. 683 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
34. 1d. at 565.
35. Bocanegra v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 605 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex. 1980).
36. 678 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1984).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 916; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 169 (subject of request for admission deemed admitted
if not answered within period of the rule).
39. 678 S.W.2d at 916.
40. 683 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
41. Id. at 565.
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claim. The court held that the worker had made an informed election.42
Practitioners should note that in both Overstreet and Smith the claim of elec-
tion of remedies was founded on requests that had been deemed admitted.
Since a party will be precluded from offering summary judgment proof con-
tradictory to deemed admissions the failure to respond to what might appear
to be innocuous requests concerning collateral benefits can be fatal.
D. Injury
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Janes 4 3 the El Paso court of ap-
peals interpreted the statutory definition of injury to not include damage to
artificial appliances. 44 The worker in Janes had previously fractured his
right femur. The fracture was treated by placing a metal compression plate
on the femur at the fracture site. The incident in question occurred while
the worker was climbing into his truck, felt a thud in his right leg, and his
leg buckled. The compression plate attached to his femur had broken. The
broken plate had to be surgically removed and a new compression plate put
in its place.
In an opinion that strictly interpreted what constitutes an injury, the court
held that the plate was in the same category as a brace or a cast.45 The court
further stated that without an expression of legislative intent recovery should
not be allowed for injuries to artificial members.46
In Davis v. Employers Insurance of Wausau47 the court addressed the
proper interpretation of occupational disease as a type of compensable in-
jury. 48 Occupational disease is statutorily defined in part as "damage or
harm to the physical structure of the body occurring as the result of repeti-
tious physical traumatic activities extending over a period of time and aris-
ing in the course of employment.. .. -149 The court noted that this provision
reflects the legislature's recognition of this type of injury as one that develops
gradually and without a specific cause or incident.50 In the Davis case the
worker had low back problems that progressively worsened and ultimately
required surgery. Her job involved handling of heavy items, twisting into
awkward positions and bending and reaching while trying to maintain bal-
ance. A doctor testified that these repetitive traumatic physical activities
were a cause of the worker's condition worsening until surgery was required.
Although the court stated that an occupational disease must be judged on a
case by case basis, it found this evidence sufficient to support the jury's find-
ing of occupational disease.5'
42. Id.
43. 687 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. Id. at 825-26.
45. Id. at 826.
46. Id.
47. 694 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. Id. at 107.
49. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1986).




The court also noted that the worker must establish a causal link between
repetitious traumatic physical activities occurring on the job and incapac-
ity.52 The court stated, however, that "the disease must be inherent in that
type of employment as compared with employment generally."' 53 The court
apparently based this conclusion on the Act's statement that "[o]rdinary dis-
eases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employ-
ment shall not be compensable . . . ,,54 The court's application of the
ordinary disease exception to the complainant in this case fails to differenti-
ate between the two distinct types of occupational diseases in the Act. The
first type is any disease that arises out of and in the course of employment
that includes those conditions commonly considered diseases or injuries in
the ordinary sense of the word, such as asbestosis or heat exhaustion. 55 The
second type of occupational disease is damage or harm to the physical struc-
ture of the body that occurs as a result of repetitious traumatic physical
activities extending over a period of time and arising in the course of em-
ployment.5 6 The second type of compensable injury is an occupational dis-
ease only because the legislature so labeled it and is not an ordinary disease
of life. This confusion of terminology is often responsible for requirements
necessary to establish the first type of occupational disease being erroneously
placed upon a worker who has sustained an injury due to repetitious trau-
matic physical activities.
E. Heart Attacks
Although Texas courts have long recognized heart attacks as being com-
pensable under certain circumstances,57 the law in this area is still in a devel-
opmental stage. A claim for compensation following a heart attack may be
predicated upon physical exertion, mental stress traceable to a definite time,
place and cause, 58 or upon repetitive traumatic physical activities.59 A
grouping of decisions along these lines allows some reconciliation of the
holdings.
In Blair v. INA60 the worker suffered from severe pre-existing coronary
disease. The medical testimony indicated the worker was on the verge of
having a heart attack at any time, regardless of activity. Shortly before his
heart attack the worker coiled up a cable that weighed over 100 pounds and






57. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 448 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (heart attack compensable when caused by strain or overexertion);
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Calhoun, 426 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (same); Midwestern Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 370 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1963, writ refed n.r.e.) (same).
58. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
60. 686 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
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this was not unusually strenuous activity, but considering the severity of the
underlying heart trouble it was the amount of activity that made the heart
attack occur at the moment it did.
The court stated that the compensation determination turns upon whether
the worker presented evidence of "an undesigned, untoward event involving
overexertion or strain traceable to a definite time, place and cause" 6' that
was a producing cause of his heart attack. 62 The court held that the jury's
finding that the worker's activities did not involve overexertion was against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. 63 The court's liberal
construction of the word overexertion is consistent with the liberal interpre-
tation of other courts, including the Texas Supreme Court, in passing upon
what activities are deemed sufficient physical exertion. 64
In Kiel v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association65 a worker engaged in
heavy manual labor for approximately one hour and then was involved in a
stressful confrontation with a co-employee. Shortly thereafter he suffered a
fatal heart attack. The medical testimony indicated that the physical exer-
tion and the mental stress of the argument incited, accelerated or aggravated
an underlying pre-existing condition thereby causing the fatal heart attack.
The court observed that within the limited area of heart attack cases the jury
does have a recognized area of common knowledge and expertise and is not
bound by expert testimony.66 The court found, however, that since the med-
ical testimony was not rebutted nor weakened on cross-examination the
jury's finding of no producing cause was against the great weight and pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 67
The court in U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Rearden68 held that a fatal heart
attack brought about by the pain and stress caused by an otherwise unre-
61. Id. at 629.
62. Id. This holding is applicable only when the worker is not relying upon repetitious
traumatic physical activities to establish a compensable heart attack.
63. Id.
64. Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. 1976) (operating hoist
caused sufficient strain); Baird v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex.
1973) (installing electrical wiring caused strain); Sunbelt Ins. Co. v. Childress, 640 S.W.2d 356,
360-61 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ) (driving truck was sufficient strain); Western Casu-
alty & Sur. Co. v. Dickie, 609 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ refd n.r.e.)
(sawing lumber caused strain); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 448 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, writ refd n.r.e.) (operating tractor caused strain); Midwestern Ins.
Co. v. Wagner 370 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963, writ refd n.r.e.) (climb-
ing in and out of truck caused heart attack).
Two recent cases addressed the issue of judicial construction of overexertion. In North-
brook Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Goodwin, 676 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1984, no
writ) the court found the exertion necessary to turn the steering wheel to avoid a collision
while driving a cement truck sufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Id.
at 453. In Royal Ins. Co. v. Goad, 667 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ)
the court held that a worker walking from his truck to his employer's building entrance and
climbing two flights of stairs was sufficient to support the jury's finding of producing cause. Id.
at 802. Note that the decisions addressing this issue may be reconciled when overexertion is
construed as that degree of exertion that is in fact a contributing cause of the heart attack.
65. 679 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
66. Id. at 659.
67. Id.
68. 695 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
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lated compensable injury gave rise to a compensable death claim. 69 This
holding is not an extend to and affect holding, 70 but rather a consideration of
the heart attack as a part of the original injury. It is significant to note that
the worker's heart attack occurred eight months following the original
injury.
The court relied uon the reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court in Stodgill
v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association7l in which the court found that
the stress from an accidental on-the-job injury was the producing cause of a
heart attack forty-seven days later. 72 The Rearden court reasoned that the
causal connection between traumatic aggravation of pre-existing conditions
and heart attacks is subject to dispute in the medical profession and that in
the case at bar direct medical evidence indicated that the stress and pain
from the original injury was a producing cause of the decedent's heart
attack. 73
In Northbrook National Insurance Co. v. Goodwin74 the court considered
the term heart attack and concluded that it is not restricted to conditions
involving lasting physical damage to the heart muscle, but that the test is
whether some form of cardiac injury occurred. 75 In Goodwin the worker had
suffered a temporary constriction of the heart arteries that caused an angina
attack. The court held that he had sustained a injury under the Act. 76
F. Hernia
One decision of note was handed down with regard to the hernia provi-
sions of the Act.77 The court in INA v. Lackey78 held that the protrusion
requirement of the statute is not applicable in cases involving umbilical her-
nias.79 The court further held that protrusion occurring five days after the
initial injury would satisfy the statutory requirement of a sudden and imme-
diate appearance after the injury. 80
G. Concurrent Injuries
In Rivera v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association8 the court addressed
the question whether a worker who had sustained concurrent general and
specific injuries was entitled to have the jury consider the combined, unseg-
regated effects of both injuries in assessing incapacity under sections 10 and
69. Id. at 762.
70. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of extend to and affect
cases.
71. 582 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1979).
72. Id. at 105.
73. 695 S.W.2d at 761-62.
74. 676 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
75. Id. at 453.
76. Id.
77. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12b (Vernon 1967).
78. 688 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
79. Id. at 690.
80. Id.
81. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 132 (Jan. 11, 1986).
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11 of the Act.8 2 The carrier relied primarily on two prior supreme court
decisions to support its position that the worker's loss in wage earning ca-
pacity was solely attributable to his leg injury. The first decision, Hargrove
v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.,83 established the rule that when the
worker suffers a specific injury and a concurrent general injury, the worker
can recover compensation only for the injury that provides the longest pe-
riod of incapacity or greatest benefits. 84 The second decision, Texas General
Indemnity Co. v. Scott,8 - held that the worker had the burden to plead, prove
and secure jury findings supporting recovery under each theory before he
could elect to recover under one of the two theories.8 6 The Rivera Court held
that the carrier's reliance on these two authorities was misplaced.8 7 The
court noted that Hargrove simply stood for the proposition that a trial court
cannot add the compensation awarded for a general injury together with the
compensation awarded for a specific injury and enter a judgment in excess of
the amount recoverable for either injury alone. 88 The court further ex-
plained that Scott was predicated upon the trial court's error in failing to
submit a sole cause issue when the incapacity issues submitted did not allow
for determination of whether the jury's finding of incapacity was based upon
the effects of the claimant's general injury, specific injury, or both.8 9 The
court in Scott did not base its decision upon any error in combining the
effects of the concurrent injuries. 90 The Rivera court held that when a
worker sustains a concurrent general and specific injury, the jury may con-
sider the combined, unsegregated effects of both injuries in assessing inca-
pacity under sections 10 and 11 of the Act.9 1
H. Extend to and Affect
In Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Aguirre92 a worker
sustained the traumatic amputation of a portion of his second, third and
fourth fingers of his right hand. Following considerable treatment, the
worker continued to experience intense pain, swelling, coldness, and poor
circulation in his right hand. Doctors diagnosed the worker as having a
condition known as sympathetic dystrophies. The worker underwent addi-
tional surgeries in an effort to relieve this condition. At the time of trial the
worker continued to experience pain, swelling, coldness and poor circulation
in his right hand. He also had trouble sleeping, had very little strength in his
82. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 10, 11 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (establishing
benefits associated with partial and total incapacity).
83. 256 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. 1953).
84. Id. at 75.
85. 253 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. 1953).
86. Id. at 653-54.





92. 690 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
1986]
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right hand, had very little use of his right hand and arm, had no feeling
under his arm and did not perspire on the right side of his face and arm.
The carrier argued that the injury was confined to the right hand or fin-
gers and that pain alone extending from an injury to a specific member of the
body does not make the injury a general one. The carrier also argued that
the worker's inability to use the fingers on his right hand because of pain and
swelling was the sole cause of his incapacity.
The jury found that the specific injury to the worker's fingers extended to
and affected his body generally and that such extension was a producing
cause of total incapacity. 93 The Aguirre court affirmed the judgment, stating
in a well reasoned opinion that:
Although symptons of this extension may be manifested primarily in
appellee's hand and fingers, this does not alter the fact that the original
injury did extend to and affect the sympathetic nervous system and that
the symptoms result from this extension. The pain produced by the
extension caused an impairment of appellee's general ability to work
resulting in total and permanent incapacity.94
I Course and Scope
In order to establish a compensable injury a worker must show that the
injury occurred in the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer
and that the injury was of the kind and character that originated in or re-
lated to the employer's business.95 In Ashley v. Home Indemnity Co.96 the
worker was a truck driver whose duties involved delivering produce between
Texas and New Mexico. While making such a delivery and traveling along a
route normally traveled by himself and other employees, the worker inexpli-
cably reversed his direction and traveled approximately eighty miles in the
wrong direction before his truck overturned and he was killed. The jury
determined that the death occurred in the course of employment. 97 The trial
court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the carrier.98
The court of appeals reversed the trial court and found that the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury's verdict.99
The Ashley court did not decide the more interesting question. Assuming
that the jury had found the death was not in the course of employment,
would the trial court have erred in refusing to grant judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict in favor of the worker's beneficiaries? As noted by the court,
the facts presented would generally raise a presumption that the worker was
acting in the scope of his employment when the injury and death oc-
93. Id. at 677.
94. Id. at 678.
95. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
96. 685 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
97. Id. at 781.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 783.
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curred.' ° ° This presumption compels a conclusion that the conduct fell
within the scope of employment as a matter of law in the absence of positive
evidence to the contrary.101 Only if positive evidence to the contrary was
introduced would the presumption vanish, and it would then be the worker's
burden to prove that the conduct was within the course of employment by a
preponderance of the evidence.10 2 There was no positive evidence to the
contrary, but since the same evidence that would raise the presumption
would also support the jury's verdict, the court did not address this question.
As a general rule, an injury received while traveling to and from work is
not compensable because such travel is not within the course of employ-
ment.10 3 Exceptions to the general rule exist when the means of transporta-
tion is furnished as a part of a worker's contract of employment, or is paid
for by the employer, is under the control of the employer, or when the em-
ployee is directed in his employment to proceed from one place to another
place. 1 04
In Callisburg Independent School District v. Favors10 5 a worker was fatally
injured in an automobile collision while she was traveling between her home
and the school in which she was teaching a home economics summer pro-
gram. She had stopped a short distince from her home to buy materials for
her students' use during the class. The store in which the teacher purchased
the materials was on her normal route to and from school. The Callisburg
court observed that the worker's injury in route to her place of employment
was not compensable under the general rule. 106 The court then considered
whether the injury was compensable under any of the exceptions. The court
held that the worker would have been making the trip even had she not
stopped to purchase supplies, since the injury occurred on her regular route
to work. 10 7 The injury was thus non-compensable.' 0 8 It would appear that
the Callisburg court reasoned that an employee cannot combine his regular
travel to or from work with the performance of a service in the furtherance
of his employer's business and still come within the exception.109
100. Id. at 782; see Lumbermen's Lloyds v. Jones, 268 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1954) (evidence
raised presumption that worker was acting within scope of employment).
101. 685 S.W.2d at 782.
102. Id.
103. See Janak v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. 1964).
104. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (Vernon 1967) (setting forth
exceptions).
105. 695 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
106. Id. at 372.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. In American Gen. Ins. v. Coleman, 303 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1957) the supreme court
held that travel may be compensable when the means of transportation was furnished by the
employer, when the employee was reimbursed for his travel expense by the employer as a part
of this contract of employment, when the employee has undertaken a special mission at his
employer's direction, or when the employee performed a service in furtherance of the em-
ployer's business with the express or implied approval of his employer. Id. at 374. This deci-
sion was before the enactment of § lb of article 8309. The Callisburg court, however, as well




In Smith v. Dallas County Hospital District" 10 the Dallas court of appeals
considered whether an employee who was on call and was injured in an
automobile collision while traveling to work was injured within the course of
employment. Each time the worker performed on call service she was paid
an extra hour's pay to cover her travel time to and from work. The court, in
affirming a summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of the
employer, adopted a restrictive interpretation of section 16 of the Act."'
The court held that the employee's transportation was not furnished or con-
trolled by the employer and that she had not literally been directed from one
place to another by her employer.' 1 2 The court further held that the extra
hour payment was not for actual travel time, but was rather a payment for
nonproductive time during which she did not perform any duties for her
employer. 1 13
The dissent argued that the employee's on call travel directly facilitated
the employer's ability to provide its services." 4 Additionally, the employer's
practice of paying for such travel time indicated the employer's considera-
tion of such travel time as being in the course of employment. I" Finally,
the dissent noted that increased trips due to the on call system exposed the
worker to risks greater than those borne by the general traveling public. 16
Since this was a review of a summary judgment, the dissent concluded that
at a very minimum a fact issue as to course of employment had been
raised. 117
In INA v. Bryant' 18 a worker who had been terminated by her employer
was injured when returning to the employer's premises to pick up her final
paycheck. The trial court granted a summary judgment against the em-
ployee that was reversed and remanded by the Waco court of appeals. The
supreme court, in affirming the court of appeals' decision, stated that if the
employer's practice required the employee to return to pick up her final pay,
her injury would be within the course and scope of employment." 9 The
court held that if the employee reasonably believed she was required to re-
turn to her place of employment to pick up her final pay, then her injury
would be incidental to her employment and incurred in the furtherance of
the employer's affairs.' 20 The court's holding encompasses the reasonable
subjective belief of the employee in determining whether an injury is
compensable. ' 2'
The Act specifically excludes consideration of certain injuries as having
110. 687 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
111. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (Vernon 1967).
112. 687 S.W.2d at 72.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 74 (Akin, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 75.
117. Id.
118. 686 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. 1985).





been sustained in the course of employment, such as an injury received while
in a state of intoxication. 122 In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Silas1 23 the
Beaumont court of appeals held that state of intoxication was to be given its
commonly understood meaning as a condition resulting from the use of alco-
holic liquor.1 24 The supreme court refused to grant an application for writ
of error, but issued a per curiam opinion in which it stated that the refusal
should not be considered as approval of the lower court's holding that state
of intoxication results only from the use of alcoholic liquor.
125
In Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Jackson12 6 the Tyler court of appeals
noted the Silas per curiam opinion and through the use of dicta broadened
the definition of intoxication to include the voluntary introduction of any
substance into a person's body that results in a loss of the normal use of
mental or physical faculties. 127 The court affirmed the trial court's refusal to
submit a state of intoxication instruction since the only evidence was that the
worker was not mentally alert, in a daze, and similar descriptions. 128 The
court reiterated the rule concerning circumstantial evidence' 29 and con-
cluded that the above testimony constituted no evidence that the worker was
intoxicated from voluntary use of alcohol or drugs. 130
J. Total Incapacity
In San Antonio v. Miranda'3 l the doctor assigned the worker a twenty
percent disability rating and placed some restrictions on his manual laboring
ability. During the time he worked following his injury he earned as much
as before his injury. The worker was forty-eight years of age with a fourth
grade education and a twenty-six year work history with his employer. The
court upheld the jury's finding of total and permanent incapacity, noting
that economic loss due to an injury is not an element necessary to show total
incapacity. 132 The fact that a worker continues to work and earn as much or
even more money following the injury is simply one factor to be weighed by
the jury in applying the Act's definition of total incapacity to the evi-
dence. 133 The court stated that "[t]he definition of total incapacity does not
require that an injured person be reduced to a condition of complete and
122. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967).
123. 631 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
124. Id. at 553.
125. 635 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1982).
126. 683 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ).
127. Id. at 881.
128. Id.
129. "To establish a fact by circumstantial evidence the circumstances relied upon must
have probative force sufficient to constitute a basis of legal inference; it is not enough that they
raise a mere surmise or suspicion of the existence of the fact or permit a purely speculative
conclusion." Lumbermen's Underwriters Alliance v. Bell, 594 S.W.2d 569, 570-71 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
130. 683 S.W.2d at 881.
131. 683 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ); see also supra notes 19-30
and accompanying text (a discussion of other aspects of Miranda).




abject helplessness causing an absolute disability to perform any kind of
labor." 34
K. Wage Rate
The injured worker bears the burden of establishing an average weekly
wage under one of three methods set forth by the Act. 135 Each method
embraces an arbitrary standard to establish a basis from which an award can
be calculated. If the worker has worked 210 days or more in the same or
similar employment during the year immediately before his injury, then his
own wages are the standard.' 36 If he has not, but other employees of the
same class have worked at least 210 days in similar employment in the same
or neighboring place during the year immediately prior to the worker's in-
jury, then such other employees' wages may be used to determine wage
rate.137 If neither of these two methods are applicable, then the standard is a
wage rate that is just and fair to both parties. 13 8 These methods are mutu-
ally exclusive. The worker cannot resort to the second method to establish
wage rate until the applicability of the first method is eliminated from the
case.139 The worker cannot resort to the just and fair method without elimi-
nating the applicability of the first and second methods. 140 While this statu-
tory scheme appears simple, its application in practice creates considerable
procedural difficulties.
In Holliman v. Leander Independent School District'4' the Austin court of
appeals grappled with the proper application of this scheme. The worker
was a cafeteria manager at a school during the school year. She did not
work 210 days during the year immediately preceding her injury. The
worker introduced evidence of another employee of the same class who had
worked for 210 days immediately preceding the worker's date of injury as a
cafeteria manager at a different school. The jury found that the worker sus-
tained permanent partial incapacity but failed to find that there was another
worker of the same class who worked at least 210 days of the year immedi-
ately preceding the injury. 142 The jury thus made no finding of a wage rate
prior to the date of injury. 143
The court held that the jury's finding of permanent partial incapacity and
failure to find a wage rate during the twelve months immediately prior to the
date of injury resulted in an irreconcilable conflict. 144 The case was there-
fore reversed and remanded for a new trial. 145 The procedural question then
134. Id.






141. 679 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
142. Id. at 95.
143. Id.




presented was how to submit proper issues to the jury when the worker seeks
to establish wage rate through the wages of another employee without creat-
ing an irreconcilable conflict should the jury fail to find that there was an-
other such employee.
The majority opinion in Holliman suggested that the worker submit the
just and fair issue conditionally when the worker seeks to rely on the wages
of another employee.146 While this submission could avoid a conflict in the
jury's findings, it would be directly contrary to supreme court rulings that
the worker cannot resort to the just and fair standard until he has discharged
his burden of eliminating the first and second standards from the case. 147
Justice Powers in a concurring opinion discussed the principle of allowing
the worker to plead and prove alternatively that the just and fair standard is
applicable if the second is inapplicable. 148 Justice Powers noted that this
solution would require some adjustments by the legislature or the courts to
the elimination rule presently imposed on the worker. 149 The concurring
opinion suggests another potential solution, that of placing the burden of
eliminating the second standard upon the carrier when the worker chooses
to proceed on the theory that the second standard is applicable.150
The dissent in Holliman argued that wage rate issue submission should
remain the same in the circumstances under discussion. 151 Additionally the
worker should have the simultaneous burden of both establishing and elimi-
nating the second standard through the offer of contradictory evidence. 152 If
the worker chooses not to assume this impossible burden and simply submits
an affirmative issue as to the second standard, and the jury fails to find such
a similar employee exists, then the worker must face a retrial of his case
without having had an opportunity to resort to the third standard to estab-
lish wage rate. 153
L. Court's Charge
Texas Pattern Jury Charges contains an alternative issue and instruction
concerning course of employment that may be submitted in heart attack
cases. 154 The supreme court in Nicholes v. Texas Employers' Insurance Asso-
ciation 5 5 specifically approved the instruction as a proper one for the jury
146. Id. at 95.
147. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Giddens, 476 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. 1972); Texas Employers
Ins. Ass'n v. Ford, 271 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. 1954).
148. 679 S.W.2d at 101 (Powers, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 105.
150. Id. at 106.
151. Id. at 96 (Shannon, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 97-98.
154. 2 STATE BAR Of TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES, PJC 29.04 (1970) sets
forth the following issue: "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that he had such
heart attack in the course of his employment by ABC Company?" The following instruction is
submitted in connection with such issue: "A heart attack is in the course of employment if it is
produced or precipitated by an employee's work or the conditions of his employment. Other-
wise a heart attack is not in the course of employment, even if it occurs on the job."
155. 692 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. 1985).
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with regard to a heart attack occurring in the course of employment. 156
In Jackson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 157 the supreme court
considered a case involving the calculation of contribution for a prior com-
pensable specific injury.'5 8 The issues submitted to the jury were those con-
tained in Texas Pattern Jury Charges.'59 The jury found the worker had
sustained a twenty-five percent loss of use of his left hand and further found
that prior compensable injuries had contributed twelve and one-half percent
to his incapacity. The question was whether the jury meant that twelve and
one-half percent of the twenty-five percent incapacity was contributed by
prior injuries, therefore allowing a recovery of twelve and one-half percent
incapacity, or whether the jury meant that the prior injury contributed
twelve and one-half percent ot the twenty-five percent incapacity thereby
allowing a recovery of 21.875 percent incapacity. ' 60 The trial court entered a
judgment of twelve and one-half percent incapacity.' 6'
The supreme court noted that although the issues were taken from the
pattern jury charges, they had never before been addressed specifically in a
reported case.' 62 The court held that the issues produced an ambiguous fact
finding and that the appellate courts must interpret findings to support the
judgment.1 63 The trial court's interpretation was therefore affirmed in a 6-3
decision. The majority opinion in Jackson does not provide an answer on
how to charge the jury so as to resolve the ambiguity found to have been
created by the issues in question.
A vigorous dissent argued that the pattern jury charge issues are gramati-
cally correct and unambiguous.' 64 The dissent asserted that the jury was
asked to find the percentage (zero to one hundred) that the prior injury con-
tributed to the twenty-five percent incapacity. 65 Justice Kilgarlin argued
that the court should reverse and render judgment for 21.875 percent
incapacity. 166
In Home Insurance Co. v. Gillum' 67 the worker sought to establish total
incapacity resulting in part from medical treatment for his initial injury.
The carrier complained about an instruction and special issue submitted to
the jury because they did not require the jury to find that the aggravating
medical treatment was reasonable or necessary as a result of the initial in-
156. Id. at 57-58.
157. 689 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. 1985).
158. Id. at 409.
159. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES, PJC 25.05 (1970) con-
tains the following issue: "Find from a preponderance of the evidence the percentage, if any,
that Plaintits injury of October 3, 1969, has contributed to the incapacity found by you." The
instruction "Answer by giving a percentage, if any" follows the issue.
160. 689 S.W.2d at 410.
161. Id. at 410-11.
162. Id. at 411.
163. Id. at 412.
164. Id. at 412 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 414.
166. Id. at 415.
167. 680 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
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jury. 168 The court approved the instruction and stated that no authority
appears for the imposition of the reasonable and necessary requirement
when the medical treatment is instituted to cure and relieve an employee
from the effects of his injury. 169 The court further held that the carrier is not
entitled to defensive issues relating to injurious practices when it fails to es-
tablish that the worker was advised to refrain from any alleged injurious
practices and that his failure to so refrain would imperil or retard his
recovery. ' 70
A special issue and instruction for the submission of an occupational dis-
ease claim was approved by the court in Davis v. Insurance of Wausau.' 7 1
The special issue tracked the language of the Act in defining occupational
disease and was followed by a submission of the full definition of injury,
which includes occupational disease. 172 This form of submission appears to
aid the jury in reaching their decision without the undue confusion often
associated with the submission of an occupational disease claim.
The supreme court addressed the proper submission of concurrent general
and specific injuries in Rivera v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association. 173
The worker sought to have the jury consider the combined, unsegregated
effects of a concurrent general and specific injury in assessing incapacity
under sections 10 and 11 of the Act. 174 He further sought to have the jury
consider loss of use of the specific member alone under section 12 of the
168. The trial court submitted the following issue: "Was the injury a producing cause of
any total incapacity?" In connection with such issue the jury was instructed that when total
incapacity results from medical treatment instituted to cure and relieve an employee from the
effects of his injury, the total incapacity is regarded as having been caused by the initial injury
since it is an aggravation regarded as a probable consequence and natural result likely to flow
from the initial injury. Id. at 850.
169. Id. at 851.
170. Id. at 848.
171. 694 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
172. The trial court submitted the following special issue:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Brenda D. Davis sus-
tained damage or harm to the physical structure of her body occurring as a
result of repetitious physical traumatic activities extending over a period of time
and arising in the course of her employment from Delta Airlines?
The trial court submitted the following definition in connection with such issue:
"Injury" means damage or harm to the physical structure of the body and such
diseases or infections that naturally result therefrom, or the incitement, accelera-
tion, or aggravation of any disease, infirmity, or condition, previously or subse-
quently existing, by reason of such damage or harm. "Injury" also means and
includes "Occupational Diseases" [meaning] any disease arising out of and in
the course of employment which causes damage or harm to the physical struc-
ture of the body and such other diseases or infections as naturally result there-
from. An "Occupational Disease" shall also include damage or harm to the
physical structure of the body occurring as a result of repetitious physical trau-
matic activities extending over a period of time and arising in the course of
employment; provided, that the date of the cumulative injury shall be the date
disability was caused thereby. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general
public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except
where such diseases follow as an incident to an "Occupational Disease" or "In-
jury" as defined.
Id. at 108.
173. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 132 (Jan. 11, 1986).
174. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 10, 11 (Vernon 1967); see supra note 81.
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Act. 1 75 The court approved submission to the jury of a series of issues that
allows the jury to first determine whether a worker's injury includes both a
general and specific injury and then consider the combined unsegregated ef-
fects of the general and specific injury in determining incapacity.' 76
The court also determined the proper method for submitting a carrier's
contention that a specific member caused the worker's incapacity. The
proper method would be to provide a conditioning instruction in connection
with the incapacity issue.' 77 Finally, the court held that after having as-
sessed incapacity based upon the combined effects of the general and specific
injury, the jury may alternatively consider only the effects of the specific
injury in assessing loss of use. ' 78 This rule allows the court properly to enter
judgment in favor of the worker for the greatest benefits recoverable. 79
M. Wrongful Discharge
The Act provides in essence that an employer may not terminate an em-
ployee for pursuing a claim under the Act.' 80 Should such a termination
occur the employee is entitled to damages and reinstatement.' 8' A worker
pursuing a claim under this section of the Act has the burden of establishing
that the employer's decision was due to the worker having pursued a
claim.' 82 In Luna v. Daniel International Corp.183 a worker sought to show
that he had been wrongfully discharged for having sought medical treatment
for a work related injury. The carrier filed a motion for summary judgment
that alleged that the worker had failed as a matter of law to establish a
causal connection between his discharge from employment and his claim for
benefits under the Act. The only summary judgment evidence presented to
the trial court were the depositions of the worker and of his foreman.
The worker testified that his foreman discouraged him from going to the
doctor. The worker further testified that the foreman seemed to be in a bad
mood and was mad about the worker's doctor visit because the foreman did
not want to do the paperwork or inform the company of the injury. When
175. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (setting benefits for
specific loss categories).
176. The trial court submitted a special issue asking the jury to determine whether the
worker's injury included his nose, face, or head, or whether the injury was confined to his right
leg. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 133. Following the issue, the jury was asked to find whether such
injury was a producing cause of total incapacity, the beginning and ending date of any such
total incapacity, whether such injury was a producing cause of partial incapacity, the begin-
ning and ending date of such partial incapacity, and Rivera's wage earning capacity during
partial incapacity. Id. The trial court further submitted a series of issues to the jury that
allowed them to make findings as to the general and specific injuries independent of each other.
Id.
177. Id. at 134.
178. Id. at 133.
179. Id.
180. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § I (Vernon Supp. 1986).
181. Id. § 2.
182. Id.
183. 683 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
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the worker returned from the doctor's office the foreman discharged him for
not returning quickly.
The worker's foreman testified that the worker had been allowed to leave
the job site during the morning to see the doctor but that he did not return
until the following day. He testified that he discharged the worker because
he had failed to return to work after going to see the doctor, and because he
was going to have to lay people off the same day anyway.
The trial court granted the carrier's motion for summary judgment. The
appellate court reversed and remanded the case for a trial on the merits,
holding that the worker's deposition testimony regarding his foreman's atti-
tude toward his doctor visits was sufficient to raise a fact issue as to the
causal connection between the worker's discharge and his claim for benefits
under the Act.1 84
N. Attorney's Fees
In cases for death benefits in which the carrier fails to admit liability prior
to the final award of the Board or disputes liability subsequent to the award,
the Act authorizes the court to award lump sum attorneys' fees not to ex-
ceed twenty-five percent of the beneficiary's recovery.1 85 The Act further
provides that upon settlement of a case in which the carrier admits liability
for the death but a dispute exists as to the proper beneficiaries, such attor-
ney's fee shall be paid periodically and not lump sum. 18 6
In Taylor v. North River Insurance Co. 187 the carrier admitted that the
worker had received a fatal injury in the course and scope of his employment
prior to trial, but continued to dispute the proper beneficiary. The court
held that when litigation of a death benefits claim is forced by the carrier the
Act authorizes a lump sum award of attorneys' fees.' 8 8 This decision stands
for the proposition that the Act authorizes lump sum attorneys' fees if liabil-
ity on all issues except proper beneficiaries is not finally admitted prior to the
Board's award.' 89
In Royal Insurance Co. v. Goad'90 a suit for workers' compensation death
benefits in which the carrier disputed liability, the trial court rendered a
judgment in favor of the worker.' 9' The judgment included an award of
lump sum attorneys' fees based upon the widow's pension table, which takes
into consideration the contingencies of both death and remarriage. 92 In
determining attorneys' fees in compensation death cases appellate courts
184. Id. at 803.
185. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art 8306, § 8(d) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
186. Id.
187. 693 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. 1985).
188. Id. at 377.
189. Id. at 377; see Stott v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 645 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. 1983)
(attorney entitled to lump sum payment); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 7(d), 8(d)
(Vernon Supp. 1986) (providing for awards of attorneys' fees).
190. 677 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
191. Id. at 802.
192. Id. For a discussion of the use of the widow's pension table, see Texas Employers Ins.
Ass'n v. Dryden, 612 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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have routinely allowed use of the widow's pension table. 193 The Goad court
held that the manner of computation of attorneys' fees was within the trial
court's discretion and that use of the widow's pension table by the trial court
did not constitute an abuse of discretion.' 94
The Act provides that if a worker is injured under circumstances that give
rise to a cause of action against some person other than the employer, the
employee may proceed against that person, pursue a claim for compensation
under the Act, or both.' 95 If the worker pursues compensation under the
Act, the carrier is subrogated to the worker's rights against the third
party. 196 At the conclusion of the third party action the Act entitles the
carrier to reimbursement for past benefits and medical expenses paid. 197 The
Act treats any recovery in excess of that amount as a credit against future
benefits for compensation and medical benefit payments for which the car-
rier would otherwise be liable. 198
These benefits are usually received by the carrier as a result of the
worker's attorney's efforts in pursuing the worker's claim against the third
party. Since the carrier has usually not agreed to compensate the worker's
attorney for his efforts, and since the carrier is sometimes represented by
their own attorney, the Act contains provisions allowing the court to award
attorney's fees to the worker's attorney for his efforts in recovering the car-
rier's subrogation interest. 199 The fee is paid out of the carrier's portion of
the recovery and cannot exceed one-third of its interest. 2°°
In Metropolitan- Transit Authority v. Plessner20 several injured workers
recovered under the Act and then pursued third party claims. The workers
settled the third party claims prior to the filing of a lawsuit. The attorneys
representing the injured workers withheld one-third of the carrier's subroga-
tion interest as attorneys' fees. The carrier filed suit for declaratory judg-
ment 20 2 seeking a declaration that the workers' attorneys were not entitled
to attorneys' fees under the Act. The carrier's primary argument was that
the provisions of the Act were inapplicable when a lawsuit had not been
filed.
193. See Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Dryden, 612 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Daugharty, 606 S.W.2d 725, 728-
29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Clapper, 605
S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); Texas Employers Ins.
Ass'n v. Critz, 604 S.W.2d 479, 484-85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Miller, 596 S.W.2d 621, 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no
writ); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Flores, 564 S.W.2d 831, 832-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ramos, 543 S.W.2d 392, 392-93 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
194. 677 S.W.2d at 802.
195. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 6a(c).
198. Id.
199. Id. § 6a(a), (b).
200. Id. § 6a(b).
201. 682 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1984, no writ).




The Plessner court observed that the purpose of section 6a of the Act was
to guarantee compensation to attorneys who actually performed the neces-
sary work in obtaining recovery of a carrier's subrogation interest. 20 3 The
court held that section 6a is applicable whether the subrogated interest is
obtained through settlement prior to or subsequent to filing of suit. 2°4 The
court noted that to hold otherwise would result in an unreasonable interpre-
tation that would require workers' attorneys to immediately file lawsuits on
claims involving a subrogation interest or to perform work on a claim for
which they would not be compensated.20 5
In Chambers v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association20 6 the court's task
was to determine the true value of the carrier's subrogation interest for pur-
poses of awarding attorney's fees to the worker's attorney. 20 7 At the time of
trial of the third party case the carrier claimed a subrogation interest in the
amount of $35,222. During trial the worker established that his future medi-
cal expenses would be $30,000. The amount of recovery from the third
party claim was sufficient to relieve the carrier from having to pay those
future medical expenses. 20 8
The court noted that in awarding attorney's fees to the worker's attorney
for obtaining the carrier's subrogated interest, the benefit accruing to the
carrier must be taken into account. 20 9 The court further observed that the
true benefit accruing to the carrier included both the amounts previously
paid by the carrier and the liability for future payments that the carrier has
been relieved from paying.210 The court of appeals held that the trial court
should have included the future medical payments that the carrier had been
relieved of paying in awarding attorney's fees under the Act.2 1
0. Employer's Liability
Employers are not required to carry worker's compensation coverage in
the state of Texas. Generally, however, those employers who do carry work-
ers' compensation are protected from common law liability for damages sus-
tained by their employees. 212 Employers who choose not to carry workers'
compensation are known as non-subscribers and are subject to common law
actions for damages brought by their employees and their common law de-
fenses to such actions are removed by the Act.213
203. 682 S.W.2d at 653.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 693 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
207. Id. at 648.
208. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (carrier reim-
bursed from recovery from third parties).
209. 693 S.W.2d at 649.
210. Id. at 650.
211. Id.
212. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967) and §§ 3a, 5 (Vernon
Supp. 1986).
213. Id. art 8306, §§ 1, 4.
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In Holiday Hills Retirement and Nursing Center, Inc., v. Yeldel1214 a non-
subscriber sought to obtain the benefits of the comparative negligence stat-
ute.215 The non-subscriber argued that the Act specifies those common law
defenses that are removed and comparative negligence is not one of those
specified. The court, in a case of first impression, noted that a plain reading
of the Act makes it clear that any negligence of the worker that is not the
sole proximate cause of the injury will not accrue to the benefit of a non-
subscriber in defending a suit by the worker.216 The only finding by a jury in
answer to a comparative negligence issue that would benefit the non-sub-
scriber would be a finding that the worker was 100 percent negligent. 217
This defensive theory is properly submitted to the jury by the inclusion of a
sole proximate cause instruction in the court's charge. 21 8 The court held
that comparative negligence is thus not applicable in non-subscriber cases
and should not be submitted to the jury. 219
In Town and Country Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Vilyeu 220 a worker was in-
jured while attempting to enter a mobile home that was under construction.
The employer, a non-subscriber, produced evidence showing that it had pro-
vided its employees with a safe method of entering the trailers under con-
struction. The employer contended that it had no duty to an injured
employee who chose to use an alternative unsafe means of entering the
trailer. The worker presented evidence that the employer was aware of and
permitted the method of entering the trailer used by the worker. The court
observed that to allow the employer's no duty contention to succeed under
these facts would be the same as allowing the employer to rely upon contrib-
utory negligence. 22I The court held that as a matter of law, when an em-
ployer knows that its employees are using unsafe methods to perform their
tasks, it is the duty of the employer to eliminate those unsafe methods. 222
Since workers' compensation coverage is optional, the Act sets forth cer-
tain notice provisions that must be complied with when an employer elects
to provide workers' compensation coverage. The employer must provide its
employees with notice that it has elected to carry workers' compensation
insurance.223  The employer's compensation insurance carrier is also re-
quired to notify the Industrial Accident Board that it is providing compensa-
214. 686 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 29 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 103 (Dec. 14, 1985).
215. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. .ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1986).
216. 686 S.W.2d at 775.
217. Id.
218. The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
There may be more than one proximate cause of an event, but there can be only
one sole proximate cause. If an act or omission of any person was the sole
proximate cause of an occurrence, then no act or omission of any other person
could have been a proximate cause.
Id.
219. Id.
220. 694 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
221. Id. at 653.
222. Id. at 655.
223. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308, §§ 19, 20 (Vernon 1967).
[Vol. 40
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
tion coverage for the employer. 224 The carrier's filing with the Industrial
Accident Board is constructive notice to the employees that coverage is
available. 2 2
5
In Ferguson v. Hospital Corporation International, Ltd.2 2 6 the employer
failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Act. The Fifth Circuit
reviewed the history and purpose of the notice requirements under the Act,
which include providing a constitutional basis for depriving injured workers
of their common law remedies. 227 The court concluded that compliance
with the notice provisions of the Act was critical to determining the em-
ployer's intention to be a subscriber under the Act.2 28 Additionally, failure
to comply with the provisions bars the employer from claiming subscriber
status and thereby limits injured workers to the exclusive remedy of recover-
ing workers' compensation benefits. 229 The court further held that an at-
tempt by the employer to comply with the notice provisions after an injury
had occurred would be ineffective since this would allow the employer to
remain silent concerning its compensation coverage until after it was able to
determine its potential liabiltiy following a worker's injury.230
A worker who is intentionally injured by his employer may pursue com-
mon law remedies even though his employer is a subscriber to the Act.231 In
Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin232 the Texas Supreme Court addressed the question
whether an employer who intentionally maintains an unsafe work place may
be held to have intentionally injured its employee and thereby be subjected
to common law liability. The court stated that the crucial question was
whether the employer had a specific intent to inflict injury.233 The court held
that the intentional failure to furnish a safe place to work does not provide a
basis for a claim of intentional injury unless the employer believed his con-
duct was substantially certain to cause the injury.234
In third party negligence claims by injured workers the supreme court has
refused to allow courts to consider the employer's negligence in order to
reduce the third party defendant's liability, since the defendant's claim for
contribution is derivative to the injured worker's right to recover from his
employer against whom contribution is sought under article 2212a. 235 In
Foley Co. v. Cox 236 the court of appeals extended the reasoning of the Varela
opinion to third party cases in which strictly liable defendants seek to appor-
224. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8308, § 18a(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
225. Id. art. 8306, § 3c (Vernon 1967).
226. 769 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1985).
227. Id. at 270-72.
228. Id. at 273.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 274.
231. See Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1981) (Act does
not exempt employer from common law liabilities for intentional act).
232. 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985).
233. Id. at 406.
234. Id. at 408.
235. Varela v. American Petrofina Co. of Tex. Inc., 658 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. 1983); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1986).
236. 679 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
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tion damages according to article 2212.237
237. Id. at 62.
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